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Helling v. Carey Revisited: Physician Liability in the
Age of Managed Care
Leonard J. Nelson III*
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Washington decided Helling v.
Carey,' perhaps the "most infamous of all medical malpractice cases."2
In Helling, the court ignored expert testimony at trial as to medical
custom and held two ophthalmologists liable as a matter of law for
failing to administer a routine pressure test (tonometry test) to detect
glaucoma.' The Helling court did its own analysis of the purported
custom of not routinely testing for glaucoma in persons less than forty
and found it lacking. Instead, it determined it was cost effective to use
the test routinely in these age groups.4
Helling is a notorious decision because it rejects the traditional
professional standard of care.' Most courts in medical malpractice
cases focus on whether the physician treated the patient in accordance
with the prevailing medical custom.' The physician who complies
with custom is not deemed negligent even though the custom itself
could be deemed inadequate to protect the patient.7 Typically, in
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malpractice cases, unlike other tort cases, the trier of fact is not asked
to weigh the risks and utilities of the physician's conduct.8 Instead,
the Helling court focused on the cost effectiveness of the treatment
that the treating physician withheld.9 Although there are a few other
cases explicitly rejecting the customary standard,1" Helling has not
been followed by courts in other states insofar as it imposes liability as
a matter of law on physicians for withholding medical treatment based
on an appellate court's cost benefit analysis." Even in Washington
State its influence has waned. 2
The opinion of the court in Helling, authored by Justice Hunter,
articulated the applicable standard of care as that of a "reasonable,
prudent physician."' 3 In a recent article, Professor Peters argues that
there is currently a trend in the courts toward adoption of the reason-
able, prudent physician standard.14 In fact, as Professor Dobbs notes:
"[C]ourts seem increasingly to blend the language of reasonable per-
son with the language of professional standards in an uncertain mix-
ture with uncertain effects."'" Moreover, it does not appear, that this
trend toward the adoption of a reasonable, prudent physician standard
has resulted in a change in the way that most malpractice cases are
tried. 6 Although courts may articulate the standard in terms of the
reasonable, prudent physician, they still generally require the plaintiff
8. Id.
9. SeeHelling, 183 Wash. 2d at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
10. See, e.g., Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979); Nowatske v. Oster-
loh, 543 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. 1996), abrogated on other grounds, Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001).
11. See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), opinion
vacated on other grounds, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980).
12. See, e.g., Harris v. Groth, 99 Wash. 2d 438, 451, 663 P.2d 113,120 (1983), wherein the
court stated:
Our holding today may be summarized as follows. The standard of care against which
a health care provider's conduct is to be measured is that of a reasonably prudent
practitioner possessing the degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other mem-
bers of the same profession in the state of Washington. The degree of care actually
practiced by members of the profession is only some evidence of what is reasonably
prudent-it is not dispositive. Absent exceptional circumstances such as were present
in Helling, expert testimony will be necessary to show whether or not a particular
practice is reasonably prudent.
13. See Helling, 83 Wash. 2d at 519, 519 P.2d. at 983.
14. Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Mil-
lennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163 (2000).
15. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 633.
16. Compare Peter D. Jacobson & Matthew L. Kanna, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the
Courts: Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 191, 300 n.6 (2000)
("Even if Peters is correct, it is not clear how the emerging reasonable physician standard differs
conceptually from professional custom and whether case outcomes are actually different in juris-
dictions switching to the new approach.").
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to present expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard
and the defendant's breach of that standard. 7
The outcome in Helling has been widely criticized. In an influ-
ential article, Professors Fortess and Kapp pointed out the shortcom-
ings of the Helling court's cost/benefit analysis in light of the high rate
of false positives on the tonometry test." Certainly, one lesson that we
may glean from Helling is that it is not wise for a court to perform its
own cost/benefit analysis without the aid of expert testimony.
On the other hand, an empirical study by Professor Wiley of the
impact of the Helling decision also casts doubt on the veracity of the
expert testimony in that case as to the prevailing custom and suggests
that courts should be somewhat skeptical of customary standards. 9 In
his study, Professor Wiley determined that "Washington ophthal-
mologists did test patients less than forty with some regularity even
before Helling."2" In light of Wiley's study, the Helling court was jus-
tified in disregarding the custom evidence in the case and focusing on
the cost-effectiveness of the treatment that was withheld even if its
cost effectiveness analysis was faulty. Indeed, with some modification
the court's approach in Helling with its focus on cost effectiveness
could point the way to a more realistic approach in malpractice cases
particularly in light of the changing role of the physician in the man-
aged care era.
As a result of threats of greater exposure to lawsuits, as well as
market pressures, health plans are dropping treatment pre-
authorization requirements and forcing treating physicians to focus on
the cost effectiveness of medical treatments. There is widespread dis-
satisfaction with the intrusion of managed care bureaucrats into the
17. See, e.g., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977) wherein the court adopted the
reasonable, prudent physician standard and then further stated:
The burden of proof is on the patient-plaintiff to establish that the physi-
cian-defendant has undertaken a mode or form of treatment which a reasonable and
prudent member of the medical profession would not have undertaken under the same
or similar circumstances. The circumstances to be considered include, but are not lim-
ited to, the expertise of and means available to the physician-defendant, the health of
the patient, and the state of medical knowledge. Unless the mode or form of treatment
is a matter of common knowledge or is within the experience of the layman, expert
testimony will be required to meet this burden of proof.
Id. at 165-66; see also Harris v. Groth, 99 Wash. 2d 438, 439, 663 P.2d 113, 114 (1983) (stating
that expert testimony usually will be necessary under reasonable, prudent physician standard).
18. Eric E. Fortess & Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic Testing, and Legal
Liability, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 213 (1985) (criticizing court's cost-benefit analysis
in light of high rate of false positives on test).
19. Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical
Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 383 (1982).
20. Id.
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physician/patient relationship. 21 This has resulted in calls for Con-
gress to remove the bar posed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and authorize lawsuits under state tort
law against health plans for denials of benefits. At this writing, the
bar to these suits has not been removed.
As a reaction to the prospect of greater liability exposure for de-
nials of benefits and market forces, however, health plans have already
been reducing their reliance on required pre-authorizations of treat-
ments and shifting responsibility for cost containment to their physi-
cians. In the fall of 1999, United Health Care, one of the largest man-
aged care plans in the United States, announced that it would no
longer require physicians to obtain pretreatment authorizations.23
Thereafter, a number of other plans announced similar changes in pol-
icy. U.S. Healthcare, a subsidiary of Aetna, hired a new C.E.O., who
vowed to reduce the number of procedures requiring precertification.24
As a result, several of the nation's largest health insurers no longer re-
quire prior authorizations for diagnostic tests or treatments, hospital
admissions, or referrals by gatekeeper physicians to specialists.
Health plans have touted their elimination of pre-authorization
requirements as a cost saving measure and an appropriate response to
changes in consumer attitudes. In announcing its decision, United
Health Care noted that it was approving virtually all requests anyway
so dropping the requirement would actually save money.2" This
change in policy may have been in part an attempt to revitalize man-
aged care stocks that had become depressed as a result of investor con-
cerns about the backlash against managed care.26 It was also an at-
tempt to reduce exposure to lawsuits in the future based on denial of
benefits by health plans.27
Under ERISA, patients cannot sue their health plans for denials
of benefits under state tort law. 28 Courts now seem to distinguish be-
21. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Poli-
tics Made Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395 (2001).
22. See, e.g., Corrine P. Parver & Kimberly Allison Martinez, Holding Decision Makers
Liable: Assessing Liability Under a Managed Care Health System, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 199 (1999).
23. Milt Freudenheim, Big H.M.O. to Give Decisions on Care Back to Doctors, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1999, at Al.
24. Barbara Martinez, Aetna Tries to Improve Bedside Manner in Bid to Help Bottom Line,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2001, at A9.
25. Freudenheim, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Heahhcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 1995), Corcoran v.
United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Joshua M. Spielberg, Overcom-
ing ERISA, TRIAL, May 2000, at 54 (discussing Dukes and Corcoran).
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tween "eligibility decisions" and "treatment decisions. "29 Claims
based on the former are preempted while the latter are not. If a claim
is completely preempted, then it may be removed to federal court and
the plaintiff is consigned to the limited remedies available under
ERISA ° When a claim against a health plan is preempted by
ERISA, a plan beneficiary may not recover compensatory and punitive
damages for personal injuries in an action against the plan.31
ERISA does not preempt claims against a health plan alleging
negligent adoption and implementation of utilization policies or negli-
gent selection, supervision, and retention of a physician. 2 On the
other hand, a claim against a health plan alleging that it negligently
delayed in providing the patient with a referral outside its physician
network is completely preempted.33 The impact of ERISA preemp-
tion on claims against physicians is not clearly defined at this time.
With the shift of responsibility for cost containment to physicians, it
is likely that physicians will frequently be making "mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions."34 In some instances, physicians may suc-
cessfully argue that ERISA preempts claims against a physician who
makes primarily eligibility decisions.35
Congress has reacted to the public's concerns about managed
care by attempting to remove the ERISA bar to state tort lawsuits.36
This legislative action has been fueled by the outcry of consumer
groups who have expressed outrage over denials of benefits by
anonymous managed care plan bureaucrats. Physicians have also
complained about health plan red tape and infringements on their
ability to provide appropriate care to their patients.37 Naturally, these
developments have encouraged health plans to shift responsibility for
29. Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Pegram
v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000)).
30. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 354.
31. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
32. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1999).
33. Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 273.
34. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229 (holding that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions by plan
physicians are not fiduciary acts under ERISA).
35. Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 279 (holding that claim against physician alleging negligent
delay in providing further treatment may be preempted under ERISA). But cf. Nealy v. U.S.
Healthcare HMO, 711 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1999) (holding a claim against physician for delay
in submitting referral form is not preempted by ERISA).
36. See, e.g., Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. § 402 (2001) (re-
moving ERISA bar against state tort law suits for denial of benefits but imposing $1.5 million
limit on noneconomic damages and making them available only where managed care plan has
failed to comply with the independent medical reviewer's decision that the benefit should be
paid).
37. See, e.g., Linda Peeno, Managed Care and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, TRIAL,
Feb. 2000, at 18.
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denials of care to the treating physicians. Professor Clark Havighurst
notes that "cost control is often achieved through sub rosa, or secret,
rationing by clinicians whose choices are influenced by financial in-
centives to economize. '"38
Where it is the physician rather than a plan administrator that
decides not to use a particular diagnostic test or treatment, the plan
may be able to point to the physician as the responsible decision
maker. Moreover, dropping prior authorization requirements and in-
stead employing financial incentives like capitation to encourage
health plan physicians to economize deflects criticism from the plan to
the physician. This could in turn reduce public scrutiny of the role of
health plan bureaucrats in implementing cost containment policies. In
fact, it seems that health plans have already revamped themselves in
response to proposed legislative reforms.39
The failure of a health plan to provide treatment recommended
by a patient's physician obviously places in high relief the role of the
plan bureaucrats. On the other hand, leaving such rationing decisions
to treating physicians is a much more subtle and less visible form of
rationing that may be less likely to result in a lawsuit. The proposal to
remove the ERISA bar to claims against plans for denial of benefits
does not seem to contemplate a system whereby the treating physi-
cians rather than the plan administrators take responsibility for im-
plementing cost containment goals. Instead, the proposed legislation
focuses on denial of benefits by plan bureaucrats. 40 In the current en-
vironment, however, treating physicians are taking primary responsi-
bility for selecting cost effective care. Therefore, it is appropriate to
modify the liability regime to take into account the physician's role in
cost containment. In this article, I propose that the traditional cus-
tom-based standard applicable in medical malpractice cases be re-
placed with a reasonable, prudent physician standard that will more
adequately take into account the role of the physician in rationing care.
38. Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of
Care, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 7,12 (2000).
39. In an interview, Charles Inlander, President of the People's Medical Society, notes:
QWill the legislation on patients' rights really make a difference for consumers?
A. I don't think consumers are going to see a major difference. The issue has been lin-
gering so long that most health plans have pretty much made all of the changes that
any version of the patient's bill of rights will have in it. The major plans have
dropped requiring prior permission to go to the emergency room and for a woman to
see an obstetrician or gynecologist. Most plans have third-party, outside review for
disputes over care decisions. The new law would mean uniformity for the managed
care companies, but most people are not going to see much of an effect.
Milt Freudenheim, Patients Rights: What Is at Stake?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at BU1.
40. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 219, 107th Cong. § 402 (2001).
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By now it is abundantly clear that managed care has changed the
traditional physician/patient relationship. The traditional relationship
was "dyadic" and the physician's role was to serve the patient by pro-
viding all medically necessary care.41 The relationship is now modi-
fied by the presence of third parties (i.e., health plans and employers)
and their role in ensuring that physicians provide care in an economi-
cally efficient manner.42 This role is perfectly legitimate in light of the
vast array of costly technological devices and pharmaceuticals now
available to the physician. Moreover, this role is also justified by the
underlying contract entered into between the patient and the health
plan insofar as that contract calls for the provision of cost effective care
and utilization of various cost containment devices.
As Professor Baruch A. Brody has noted, physicians function in
two roles vis-A-vis their patients: (1) the "professional" role, and (2)
the "honest businessman" role.43 As a "professional," the physician
serves primarily in a fiduciary role. In this role, physicians are ex-
pected to act in their patient's best interests. "The model of physician
as professional calls for physicians to place patient interests first and
their own economic interests second .... ,
On the other hand, under the "honest businessman" model, the
physician/patient relationship is essentially a business relationship in
which the physician acts in his or her own economic self interest. But
this does not mean that the physician is free of any external ethical re-
41. E. HAAvI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S ECONOMICS 2 (1995). Professor Morreim notes:
If the physician-patient was once a simple dyad, this was only because the times, and
medicine itself, were simpler. In the vastly more complex present and future, the
physician's obligations to the patient can no longer be a single-minded, unequivocal
commitment, but rather must reflect a balancing. Patient's interests must be weighed
against the legitimate competing claims of other patients, of payers, of society as a
whole, and sometimes even of the physician himself. Although there still is a physi-
cian-patient relationship, it is now set within a broader health care nexus. In this lat-
ter context, the rights and interests of economic agents, society, and other parties are
both routine and proper, not exceptional or per se morally distasteful.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Baruch A. Brody, The Physician as Professional and the Physician as Honest Businessman,
119 ARCHIVES OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY 495, 495 (1993).
44. Id.; see also Martin Gunderson, Eliminating Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care Or-
ganizations Through Disclosure and Consent, 25 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 192, 195 (1997).
[P]atient consent determines the scope of the underlying duty of the physician to ex-
ercise professional judgment and thereby influences what counts as good practice.
Because the exercise of professional judgment is now included within its scope of cost
containment, a conflict of interest no longer exists between the incentives placed on a
physician to minimize costs and the duty to exercise professional judgment in patient
care.
2002]
Seattle University Law Review
straints. On the contrary, in the "honest businessman role," the phy-
sician is expected "to pursue his or her economic interests by provid-
ing necessary quality services in an honest fashion."4 Moreover, in
this latter role, it is appropriate for physicians to provide their patient
with cost-effective care in accordance with the cost containment goals
of the patient's health plan. In the "professional" role, the physicians
are responsible for serving the interests of their patient by providing
care that meets the needs of their patient. In the "honest business-
man" role, however, the physician is primarily concerned with the
economics of medicine. While there may be some tension between
these two roles, it is also possible to reconcile them. And it is not per
se immoral or unethical for a physician to balance the patient's needs
and desires against the costs of proposed treatments.46
Under the traditional customary malpractice standard that devel-
oped in the days of fee for service medicine, the plaintiff in a malprac-
tice action must present expert testimony that the physician failed to
comply with the prevailing professional custom. 47 In theory, the phy-
sician who complies with the prevailing custom is absolved of liability.
In affixing liability, reliance on the customary standard focuses the at-
tention of the fact finder on the failure of the individual physician to
abide by the prevailing standard of care in a particular medical com-
munity, whether it is local or national. While some commentators
have criticized the continued use of the traditional customary standard
in medical malpractice cases,48 others have defended its use.49 None-
theless, regardless of the utility of the traditional customary standard
in relation to the evaluation of the physician's performance in the
"professional" role, it cannot adequately measure the physician's per-
formance in the "honest businessman" role.
My focus in this article is on physician liability rather than on the
liability of health plans for denials of benefits. It may be that it would
be preferable, as suggested by Professor Havighurst, to hold health
plans exclusively liable for the negligence of plan physicians."0 None-
45. Brody, supra note 43, at 495.
46. MORREIM, supra note 41, at 2.
47. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 18 (1991).
48. See, e.g., James A. Henderson & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Con-
tinued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382
(1994); Theodore A. Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of
Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193 (1992).
49. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 709 (2001).
50. Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA.
L. REV. 587, 588 (1997); see also William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Mal-
practice and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 27 (1994) (arguing for
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theless, this reform is not likely to be widely adopted in the immediate
future. And even if it were adopted, it would still be necessary to de-
termine that the physician acted negligently in order to hold the plan
vicariously liable.
Under the reasonable prudent physician standard that I propose,
custom evidence would no longer be determinative in medical mal-
practice cases, but evidence as to prevailing practices would continue
to be admissible as evidence on the question of whether the physician
acted as a reasonable, prudent physician. While it would not be im-
perative that the plaintiff present such evidence in all cases, most
plaintiffs and defendants would nevertheless still present such evi-
dence in many cases. In cases involving a refusal to provide a particu-
lar diagnostic procedure or treatment, however, the focus would be on
whether or not the physician properly assessed the cost effectiveness of
the alternative procedures or treatments rather than on prevailing
practices.
This proposal is particularly appropriate in light of recent
changes in the managed care market whereby physicians are increas-
ingly held responsible for delivering care in accordance with the cost
containment goals of the patient's health plan. Physicians are now ex-
pected to take into account cost effectiveness in determining whether
to employ a particular treatment or diagnostic procedure. In these
cases, prevailing practice evidence could divert attention from the
more appropriate inquiry into whether the physician has properly per-
formed in her "honest businessman" role. Under my proposed rea-
sonable prudent physician standard, the focus in malpractice cases
arising out of the failure of the physician to use a particular diagnostic
technique or treatment would be on the influence of financial incen-
tives and cost effectiveness analysis rather than on custom. I argue
that my proposed reasonable prudent patient standard is better than
the customary standard insofar as it takes into account the legitimate
role of the physician in providing cost effective care and holds the
physician accountable in that role.
Part I of this article focuses on the heightened tension between
tort and contract in managed health care. Part II of this article exam-
ines managed care cost containment techniques and their possible im-
pact on physician decision making. Part III focuses on the widely ac-
knowledged shortcomings of the customary standard. Part IV
enterprise liability at the health plan level); but cf. Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enter-
prise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV.
381, 415, 434 (1994) (arguing that it would be more appropriate to place sole responsibility for
physician malpractice on hospitals rather than on health plans; also arguing in favor of a no fault
system).
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provides an outline of the doctrinal regime for my proposed reason-
able, prudent physician standard.
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN TORT AND CONTRACT
As many commentators have noted, medical malpractice cases
are on the boundary between tort and contract."5 Since medical mal-
practice cases involve parties who are not strangers and have been in-
volved in a preexisting consensual undertaking, they are in some ways
more closely related to contract than to tort. Accordingly, contract en-
thusiasts such as Professors Epstein 2 and Havighurst"3 have advocated
greater reliance on contract as opposed to tort in providing compensa-
tion for iatrogenic injuries. In this regard, Professor Robinson argues:
"The affirmative case for contract is simple and powerful. In terms of
utilitarian efficiency, contractual arrangements allow parties to achieve
the most efficient combination of efforts to manage risk in accordance
with their respective comparative advantages and their respective risk
preferences."s4
Legal categories of criminal law, tort law, and contract law are lo-
cated on a spectrum ranging from relatively high to relatively low lev-
els of state control. In our legal culture, where an extensive social wel-
fare system is coupled with a market economy, the placement of cases
into these legal categories reflects societal attitudes toward the impor-
tance of certain activities or exchanges."5 Some injury inflicting activi-
ties deemed particularly significant in terms of their social, economic
and political consequences or particularly noxious in moral terms may
subject participants to state regulation under the criminal law. This
carries with it the threat of punitive sanctions for violation of state-
sanctioned norms. Although generally iatrogenic injuries have not
been dealt with under the criminal law, Professor Humbach has pro-
posed that managed care officials should be subject to criminal prose-
cution in cases where the denial of a benefit they are legally obligated
51. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 93 (1976).
52. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE 412-16 (1997).
53. Clark A. Havighurst, Prospective Self Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to Accept
Health Care Rationing Tomorrow, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1806 (1992).
54. Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Pa-
tients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 172, 183.
55. See generally Guido Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV.
519, 521 (1978) ("Tort law and more particularly the rule of liability is... the paradigmatic law
of the mixed society. The purely 'liberal,' laissez-faire polity prefers contracts, the truly collec-
tive state the criminal sanction; tort law lies in between.")
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to provide to some patient results in injury to the patient.5 6 Nonethe-
less, criminal prosecutions of physicians for malpractice are rare. The
traditional reluctance to criminalize the infliction of iatrogenic injury
is not surprising in light of the typically benign motive of the physi-
cian responsible for inflicting the injury.
Other injury inflicting activities deemed less significant in their
effects or less egregious in their moral impact may be dealt with under
tort law where sanctions are imposed for violation of state defined
norms. Activities deemed even less significant in their social, eco-
nomic, political, and moral consequences may be treated as private
matters subject to contractually defined standards set by the parties to
the exchange. Traditionally, our courts have been unwilling to allow
contract law to displace tort law in cases involving iatrogenic injury.
Tort law imposes certain obligations notwithstanding agreements
reached by the parties.
In a perfectly functioning market, tort remedies would arguably
be unnecessary to ensure the provision of health care at an acceptable
level of quality and quantity. In theory, deterrence and compensation
goals could be served by reliance on the market. Patients who were
dissatisfied with the quality of care provided by a particular health
plan could merely shift to a plan that would provide a more acceptable
level of quality. Eventually, poor quality health plans would find
themselves without patients and would either improve quality or be
driven from the market. And appropriate levels of compensation for
iatrogenic injuries and liability standards could be bargained for as
part of the contracting process between the patient and the health
plan. In a perfectly functioning market, it might not be necessary to
resort to the uncertain remedies available under tort law.
Arguably, health plans and physicians should be able to contract
out of tort liability for iatrogenic injury resulting from the withholding
of care where the physician is merely implementing the cost contain-
ment features of the patient's health plan. Courts have been hostile to
preclaim waivers of the right to sue by a patient.5 7 But perhaps a
stronger argument could be made for allowing a more narrowly tai-
lored waiver of the right to sue in tort where the physician is acting to
conserve resources in accordance with the plan's cost containment
goals.
In theory, such an option could be attractive to employers if it
would reduce the cost of coverage. Certainly, employers may be con-
56. John A. Humbach, Criminal Prosecution for HMO Treatment Denial, 11 HEALTH
MATRIX 147 (2001).
57. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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cerned about the quality of care provided to their employees under
their health plan because employee dissatisfaction with the plan could
result in the loss of valuable employees. But most employees may not
be particularly concerned ex ante about such a waiver provision even if
they were aware of it at the time that they enrolled in the health plan.
If this is the case, then inclusion of such a clause may not work to the
disadvantage of the employer in attracting employees. Post injury,
however, such clauses could over time breed employee dissatisfaction.
Although commentators such as Professor Havighurst5" have
proposed limiting liability by contractual provisions, health plans have
not rushed to include these provisions in their master contracts. This
is not surprising, since health plans have a strong incentive to tout the
quality of their product when marketing it to employers. A no-
liability or sharply restricted liability feature could undermine claims
of quality insofar as it gave employees the impression that the plan
was of inferior quality. Employers also have a strong incentive to tout
the quality of their health plans to their employees and would not de-
rive any benefit from providing a plan perceived to be of poor quality
to their employees. Provision of an employer-sponsored health care
plan is not mandatory in most of the United States.59 Most employers
offer health plans in an effort to attract and retain qualified employees.
If an employer offers a health plan that is perceived as poor quality,
this may run off better employees.
Consumer advocates argue that allowing health care providers to
contractually modify the standard of care in malpractice cases could
result in a liability regime that does not adequately take the interests of
patients into account.60 Professor Atiyah notes: "[Tlhe reality is that
the rules which will govern the physician/patient relationship will not
be tailored to the individual patient's needs at all. They will be fixed
by third parties, just as much as the tort rules."6'
Typically, health plan subscribers do not have the opportunity to
bargain directly with their plan over the terms and conditions of their
coverage. In most instances, patients receive coverage through their
place of employment. Judicial enforcement of contractual limitations
on tort claims against health plans and physicians would be more de-
58. Havighurst, supra note 53.
59. But see HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 393-2 (1999) (mandating provision of employer
sponsored health insurance).
60. See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 287; Sylvia A. Law, A Consumer Perspective on Medical
Malpractice, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 305, 316-17 (1986).
61. Atiyah, supra note 60, at 296.
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fensible if employees had a greater choice of health plans. But many
employers offer only one health plan to their employees.
Even if there are alternative health plans available, changing
plans may not be an attractive solution. Changing plans may result in
changing physicians and the other available plans may have undesir-
able features.63 In light of these factors, tort law should not be dis-
placed in favor of contract as the governing regime for compensating
negligently inflicted iatrogenic injuries regardless of whether the in-
jury results from the physician's failure in either the "professional" or
"honest businessman" role. Instead, I propose modifications to the
tort regime that would adequately take into account physicians' dual
roles.
Tort law has traditionally provided remedies for iatrogenic inju-
ries due to negligent medical care under a custom-based standard of
care. Using the custom-based standard has been justified by reference
to an implicit contract between the physician and the patient to pro-
vide care in accordance with the prevailing customs of the medical
profession.64 Under this view, the custom-based standard imposes
tort liability based on the understandings of the parties to the underly-
ing contract for the provision of medical care.
Prior to the advent of managed care, the implicit contract be-
tween the physician and the patient usually did not include cost con-
tainment provisions. Under managed care, however, the explicit con-
tract between the patient or the patient's employer and the health plan
typically obligates the plan to provide medically necessary care, but
also provides for cost containment features. In this context, a deliber-
ate refusal by a physician to provide a particular treatment to a patient
because of its cost may be viewed as an appropriate attempt to imple-
ment the cost containment guidelines of the plan.
62. Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Voice and Representation in Managed Healthcare, 34 J.
HEALTH L. 223, 229 (2001). Professor Rodwin notes:
First, participation in MCOs is often not voluntary. For many privately insured indi-
viduals, being a managed care subscriber is not a matter of choice. Most employers
do not give employees a choice of more than one health plan. In 1999, 35% of covered
employees were offered only one health plan and only half of employees were offered
three or more plans. In 1998, 54% of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in health
plans. And once an individual is enrolled in an MCO, his choice is more restricted
than otherwise.
Id. (citations omitted).
63. MARC A. RODWIN, PROMOTING ACCOUNTABLE MANAGED CARE: THE
POTENTIAL ROLE FOR CONSUMER VOICE 10-11 (2000) (School of Public and Environmental
Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana; Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis).
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 185 (5th ed. 1998).
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At the time that the patient purchased coverage, he or more
likely the patient's employer found that these cost containment fea-
tures were a desirable feature of the health plan. When health insur-
ance is provided by the place of employment, the employer is in effect
operating as the employee's agent in searching and contracting for in-
surance. Thus, it is inefficient to allow a malpractice lawsuit to nullify
the contract when the cost containment techniques actually have some
impact. The patient should not be able to use a lawsuit in tort to re-
write the contract after an injury occurs as a result of the appropriate
use of cost containment techniques. Allowing tort to replace contract
in this way may undermine cost containment and increase the cost of
health care to the patient. It may also be seen as an unwarranted at-
tempt by courts to interfere with market forces.
The advent of managed care has resulted in the modification of
the traditional relationship between physician and patient. Under the
older fee-for-service system, the physician was expected to provide
treatment to the patient in accordance with the prevailing standards of
the profession without regard to cost considerations. Even after the
advent of health insurance in the 1930s, insurers did not generally im-
pose significant cost restraints on physicians. Typically, health insur-
ers reimbursed physicians in accordance on a fee-for-service basis and
health insurers rarely interfered with the medical judgment of the phy-
sician as to the appropriate mode of treatment.
65
Under managed care, however, contractual arrangements be-
tween the physician, the plan, and the patient impose significant cost
restraints. The patient, or the patient's employer, purchases coverage
for medically necessary health care services from the health plan, but
this coverage also includes cost containment features. The patient
benefits from these cost containment features because of the relatively
lower cost of coverage as compared to traditional health insurance that
provides coverage on a fee-for-service basis. The physician may also
enter into an agreement with the health plan to provide services to its
subscribers in accordance with its cost containment features.
Typically, the physician and patient do not enter into an explicit
contract at the point of delivery of care setting out the terms and con-
ditions governing the treatment relationship. Moreover, they usually
do not specify the doctrinal regime that will govern any actions
brought by the patient for injuries arising from treatment. In the cur-
rent environment, when the patient seeks care, the patient expects the
physician to provide medically necessary care that is fully covered by
65. Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 400 (1996).
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the health plan with the exception of the usual copayments and
deductibles. Most patients do not want to pay out-of-pocket for care
that is beyond the coverage provided by their health plan. And most
patients (or their employers) would not want to pay significantly
higher premiums in the future because of the failure of the health
plans to implement cost containment guidelines. Accordingly, an im-
plicit term of the contract between the patient and physician is that the
physician will provide cost-effective care in accordance the cost con-
tainment goals of the patient's health plan.66
The physician's role in rationing care should be viewed as legiti-
mate in the current environment. The remaining question is whether
the physician's failure to act appropriately in the rationing role should
be redressable in tort or solely in contract. Professor Morreim has
noted a distinction between defects of expertise and defects of re-
sources that parallels the distinction between contract and tort.67 Ac-
cording to Morreim, expertise defects are attributable to deficiencies
in "knowledge, skill or effort" by health care providers.68 On the other
hand, "resource defects" are due to economic constraints.69
The purpose of Morreim's classification scheme is to determine
the applicable doctrinal regime in particular cases. She proposes that a
tort regime should apply to defects of expertise and a contract to de-
fects of resources.7" She further acknowledges, however, that, in a
given case, both resource and expertise defects may be intertwined and
difficult to separate.71 Accordingly, delineation of the respective
spheres of tort and contract requires intensive factual investigation.
72
Indeed, delineating and separating the physician roles in a particular
case in order to apply differing doctrinal regimes would be a daunting
task for judges and jurors. As noted by the United States Supreme
Court in Pegram v. Herdrich, physicians working with a health plan
66. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Cost Containment, 85
IOWA L. REV. 261, 351 (1999). Professor Gunderson states: "Patients who voluntarily and
knowingly join a managed care plan that provides incentives to physicians to contain costs are in
effect consenting to professional judgment that takes into account costs as well as health needs."
Id. (quoting Gunderson, supra note 44, at 195). "In this way, patient consent determines the
scope of the underlying duty of the physician to exercise professional judgment and thereby in-
fluences what counts as good medical practice." Gunderson, supra note 44, at 195.
67. E. Haavi E. Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring The Legal Stan-
dard of Care, 59U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 35 (1997).
68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 40.
70. Id. at 41.
71. Id. at 63-64.
72. Id. at 81-82.
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may frequently be called upon to make "mixed eligibility and treat-
ment decisions" that implicate both expertise and resource issues.73
There is a relative dearth of physician malpractice cases explicitly
focusing on resource limitations as a defensible basis for withholding
care. 74 There are, however, undoubtedly, many cases where courts or
juries have sub silentio taken into account resource limitations. For ex-
ample, Schrempf v. State,75 a 1985 New York opinion, provides an ex-
ample of a case where the court implicitly takes into account resource
limitations in rejecting a tort claim against a physician. The patient in
Schrempf was an outpatient from a state psychiatric facility. The
claimant's husband was an employee of an organization providing vo-
cational rehabilitation to the patient. The patient killed claimant's
husband. The claimant argued that the psychiatrist was negligent in
allowing the patient to remain as an outpatient after she discovered he
was no longer taking his medication.
In Schrempf, the New York Court of Claims concluded that the
psychiatrist was negligent in initially admitting the patient to outpa-
tient care and should have done "something more" at the time she dis-
covered the patient was no longer taking her medication. 6 On appeal,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, characteriz-
ing the physician's exercise of discretion "as an exercise of professional
judgment for which the State cannot be held responsible."7 7  It then
dismissed the plaintiffs claim, holding that, as a matter of law, the
state could not be held liable for the psychiatrist's decisions. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the psychiatrist had performed an
appropriate risk/benefit analysis in making the determination to allow
the patient to remain as an outpatient rather than attempting to hospi-
talize him on an involuntary basis.7 The court did not focus on the
customary standard, and recognized that the treatment decision had to
be based upon the facts of the individual case.
73. Pegrarn v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228-29.
74. But cf. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 879 (Miss. 1985) (discussing resource limita-
tions as a factor to consider in establishing the professional standard of care where the malprac-
tice occurs in a rural area with limited availability of health care personnel, facilities, and equip-
ment), superseded by statute as stated in Narkeeta Timber Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 777 So. 2d 39,
(Miss. 2000) (statute abolishes joint and several liability over fifty percent of the judgment and
leaves untouched joint and several liability up to fifty percent of the judgment).
75. Schrempf v. State, 487 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 1985); see also RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 142-47 (1999) (discuss-
ing SchrempJ).
76. Schrempf, 487 N.E.2d at 886.




Although cost factors were not explicitly articulated in the opin-
ion, these factors could have been a significant factor in the psychia-
trist's decision to continue with treatment on an outpatient basis. The
costs of inpatient care are obviously much greater, and the state has to
be concerned about its use of the limited resources available for treat-
ment of the mentally ill. Arguably, in Schrempf, the claim was re-
jected because of resource constraints. Schrempf suggests that courts
in malpractice action may sub silentio recognize the legitimate role of
resource constraints as a defense to liability.
It may not be necessary to displace a tort regime with a contract
regime in order to recognize the physician's legitimate role in imple-
menting cost containment. The traditional tort doctrine of assump-
tion of risk could come into play in this context. On occasion, courts
have recognized express assumption of the risk as a defense to mal-
practice liability in cases involving experimental treatment.79 On the
other hand, courts have not generally upheld releases from liability for
negligently provided medical treatment.8"
It is likely that an express agreement by the patient to assume the
risks of adverse outcomes resulting from the provision of cost-effective
care would be upheld by courts if there was no negligence on the part
of the health care provider in the selection or provision of treatment.
In these instances, there has been no breach of duty on the part of the
health care provider. The express assumption of risk, however, is
more problematic where there is provider negligence in the provision
or selection of care.
Traditionally, courts have not allowed patients to assume this
risk. From the standpoint of deterrence, it does not make much sense
to allow a patient to assume the risk of unskillfully provided care.
This merely has the effect of undermining incentives for physicians to
maintain the level of their skills. On the other hand, patients should
arguably be able to assume the risk of negligently selected treatment in
order to serve the goal of cost containment. This may provide some
financial benefit to the patient in the long run insofar as it encourages
physicians to be more aggressive in their pursuit of cost containment
goals. But negligently selected treatment is unlikely to provide long-
term benefits to either the health plan or the patient if it results in an
injury to the patient that could have been avoided by the selection of a
more appropriate alternative.
79. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing availability
of defense of express assumption of the risk in a medical malpractice action against a physician
using non-traditional means for the treatment of breast cancer).
80. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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By purchasing a health insurance plan with cost containment fea-
tures, the patient impliedly assumes the risk of adverse outcomes re-
sulting from the nonnegligent selection of cost-effective treatment.
This proposition accords with conventional tort law because it does
not involve any breach of duty by the physician. It is, however, more
difficult to argue that the patient also assumes the risk of negligently
selected treatment unless the patient is fully informed of the risks and
benefits of the care selected and various alternatives. But even if the
patient is given that information, the patient should not be expected to
be able to do a sufficient analysis of cost effectiveness in order to de-
termine whether the physician has selected the appropriate treatment.
By signing up for the health plan, the patient has agreed to accept the
cost containment goals of the plan as properly implemented, but not to
assume the risk of negligent selection of treatment by the physician.
The patient is relying on the physician's expertise in selecting cost-
effective treatment and diagnostic tools.
Continued reliance on the tort system is necessary to provide in-
centives for physicians to exercise reasonable care in the selection of
treatment. Allowing physicians to avoid liability for negligent selec-
tion of treatment under a contract regime would pose a risk of under
deterrence. Tort law should be used to enforce the patient's legitimate
expectation that the physician will properly select cost-effective treat-
ment in accordance with the cost containment goals of the plan. On
the other hand, however, physicians should be held responsible in tort
for the negligent selection of treatment or diagnostic tools.
II. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF COST CONTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES ON PHYSICIAN DECISIONS
Although some commentators have voiced concern that the
abandonment of pre-authorization by health plans could lead to an in-
crease in costs for consumers," this overlooks other available cost sav-
ing techniques. Health plans utilize an assortment of financial, clini-
cal, and managerial techniques to deliver health care in a cost-effective
manner. There is great variation among health plans, but the most
frequently used cost containment techniques are the following: (1) se-
lective contracting with providers; (2) aligning incentives so that pro-
viders will take cost effectiveness into account in making treatment de-
cisions; (3) use of gatekeepers to control access to specialists and
hospitals; (4) use of prospective, concurrent, and retrospective review;
(5) use of practice guidelines or clinical protocols; (6) physician profil-
81. Myriam Marquez, Change in Way HMO Does Business is a Wise Political Move,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 12, 1999, at A16.
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ing comparing plan physicians with peers around the country; and (7)
deselection of providers who do not practice cost-effective medicine.
8 2
One of the most potent cost containment techniques is aligning
incentives so as to encourage cost containment. Financial incentives
include bonuses, withholds, and capitation.83 Health plans may offer
bonuses to physicians for practicing cost-effective medicine.84 A plan
may also withhold a portion of a capitation payment to a physician
and place it in a risk pool to be used to pay for referrals to specialists
or hospitalization. At the end of the fiscal year, the physician may re-
ceive a portion of the funds left in the risk pool.8" One particularly po-
tent form of financial incentive is the global capitation of physicians,
which effectively shifts the financial risk of over-utilization from the
health plan to the physicians.86 Under global capitation, it is the phy-
sicians rather than the health plan administrators that decide what care
to provide.
In addition, using clinical practice guidelines is becoming more
widespread.87 Health plans, professional groups, and governmental
agencies develop guidelines.88 Typically, guidelines developed by
health plans are motivated by cost control concerns.89 Guidelines may
be used as a tool in physician profiling in order to determine whether
or not a physician is practicing in a cost-effective manner.9" If not,
then the physician's mode of practicing medicine can be brought into
question. Obviously, the threat of deselection can be a very potent in-
fluence if the plan has a large share of the relevant market.
Using preauthorization requirements and gatekeeper referrals to
specialists is on the wane. When preauthorization requests are re-
quired, nonphysicians may question the judgment of the treating phy-
sician. Admittedly, ultimate review of the authorization may involve
review by a physician, but even here the physician doing the review
may not have the same specialty credentials as the treating physician
82. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, The American Health Care System: Physicians and the
Changing Medical Marketplace, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 584 (1999); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts
in Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604 (1995).
83. Paul A. Sugarman & Valerie A. Yarashus, Admissibility of Managed Care Financial In-
centives in Medical Malpractice Cases, 34 TORT& INS. L.J. 735, 739 (1999).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also Krause, supra note 66, at 284.
87. Robert Kuttner, Must Good HMOs Go Bad? Second of Two Parts: The Search for
Checks and Balances, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1998).
88. Mello, supra note 49, at 650.
89. Id. at 651.
90. Id.; Jerome P. Kassire, The Use and Abuse of Practice Profiles, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED.
634 (1994) (expressing concern about uses of physician profiles).
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and will not be as familiar with the patient.9 And of course, this addi-
tional level of bureaucracy is expensive.
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CUSTOMARY STANDARD
A. The Unique Role of Custom in Malpractice Cases
In its exclusive reliance on custom, professional malpractice law
is unique: it is the only area of tort law where custom is not merely
relevant-it is binding on the courts. The emphasis on the customary
standard is based on deference to professional judgment. This in turn
is based on the notion that professionals are not typical economic ac-
tors. Those who are called to a profession are deemed to have em-
braced an ethic of selfless devotion to the interests of their clients or
patients. In this view, a professional is by definition one who should
be above the temptations of financial self-interest.
This exclusive reliance on custom has also been viewed as appro-
priate because of the patient's expectation that the physician will treat
him or her in accordance with the prevailing professional standards.92
Reliance on medical custom allows the medical profession to set its
own standards. This deference has been justified by the specialized
knowledge possessed by the medical profession and the inaccessibility
of that knowledge to lay persons.93 Historically, this exclusive reliance
on custom has been viewed as beneficial to the medical profession, but
with the advent of managed care, it could actually prove to be detri-
mental to physicians.
There has been considerable debate as to whether courts will
adequately take into account and defer to newer cost sensitive modes
of practice.94 Certainly, at a more practical level, there is no guarantee
that the expert testimony presented by plaintiffs as to the standard of
care will take into account the legitimate role of cost containment on
the decision of the treating physician to provide or withhold a particu-
lar treatment. Indeed, there are still some commentators who argue
that physicians are required to provide optimal care to all their pa-
tients without regard to the coverage provided by the patient's health
care plan.9" Moreover, in this context, the defendant may antagonize
91. Thomas Bodenheimer & Lawrence Casalino, Executives with White Coats-The Work
and World View of Managed-Care Medical Directors-First of Two Parts, 341 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1945 (1999) (discussing role of physicians and managed care plan medical directors).
92. POSNER, supra note 64, at 185.
93. WEILER, supra note 47, at 20.
94. See, e.g., Jacobson & Kanna, supra note 16, at 291-326.




the jury by bringing up cost as a justification for her failure to employ
what is arguably customary care.
Even within the body of traditional malpractice law, there are
certain pockets where some courts recognize that it is inappropriate to
premise liability on a physician's failure to conform to a unitary cus-
tom. The honest error of judgment and respectable minority doctrines
may both be viewed as attempts to modify the traditional reliance on a
unitary custom in order to deal with the problems of uncertainty in the
practice of medicine. For many conditions there are numerous treat-
ment options available. These doctrines provide physicians with im-
munity when making a good faith choice among various treatment op-
tions.
Under the honest error of judgment (or professional judgment)
doctrine, courts defer to the decision of the physician to pursue a par-
ticular mode of treatment. This doctrine recognizes the need to pro-
vide the physician with a zone of immunity when his or her judgment
in evaluating the available treatment options is challenged by an in-
jured patient.96 The respectable minority doctrine (or two schools
thought doctrine) recognizes patterns of variation in prevailing cus-
toms and protects a physician who complies with a customary stan-
dard followed by a minority of physicians.7 Both doctrines are used
primarily in cases where the physician has made a correct diagnosis,
but the patient is complaining that the treatment modality was negli-
gently selected.
In recent years, some courts have rejected the honest error of
judgment doctrine.9" Other courts have, however, held that the giving
of such an instruction may be appropriate where necessary to protect a
physician's exercise of discretionary authority in the selection of avail-
able treatments.99 The honest error of judgment doctrine attempts to
provide additional leeway for a physician who selects a particular
course of treatment.
The respectable minority or two schools of thought doctrine op-
erates somewhat differently from the honest error of judgment doc-
trine. The respectable minority doctrine is used where the treatment
modality chosen by the treating physician is not in conformity with
the customary standard employed by a majority of the medical profes-
sion, but does conform to the customary practices of a respectable mi-
nority of the profession. This approach provides the physician with
96. See, e.g., Kinning v. Nelson, 281 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1979).
97. See, e.g., Churnbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1974).
98. See, e.g., Oullette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1986).
99. See, e.g., Yates v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., 549 S.E.2d 681, 690 (W. Va. 2001)
(upholding use of instruction in appropriate cases but not in case at bar).
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immunity from liability for choosing a particular course of treatment
in accord with this minority custom."' It provides a physician with
some leeway in exercising his or her decision-making authority.
The respectable minority doctrine also recognizes that in some
instances there is no unitary custom. As Professor Morreim has
noted, however, the respectable minority standard can no longer ac-
count for the diversity of approaches to treatment in the current health
care environment. She states: "Medicine is no longer characterized by
a mainstream practice surrounded by a limited number of alterna-
tives." '' Both the honest error of judgment and respectable minority
rule should be contrasted with occasional decisions requiring a physi-
cian to use his or her "best judgment" in treating a patient.102 In these
cases, courts have held a physician accountable despite his or her pro-
vision of treatment in accordance with a prevailing practice.
B. The Myth of the Existence of a Unitary Custom
Insofar as it presupposes the existence of a unitary standard, the
reliance on custom as determinative is inappropriate in the current
health care environment. This is particularly true when it comes to
decisions to withhold a particular diagnostic tool or treatment because
of costs. The customary standard simply fails to take the complexity
and diversity of the contemporary health care system into account.
Exclusive reliance on custom may have been more appropriate in the
older fee-for-service system, where the physician was an autonomous
decision maker who was not required to take cost into account when
treating insured patients, but it is not defensible in the current envi-
ronment.
Several commentators have noted the dissonance between the no-
tion of a unitary custom and the actual functioning of the current
health care system. For example, in a 1994 article Professors Hender-
son and Siliciano stated: "[M]odern medicine displays few of the fea-
tures that tend to generate reliable customs in other contexts."'0 3 And
in a 1997 article, Professor Morreim notes: "Prevailing practice has
been replaced by near chaos; what is customary depends upon who is
asked.' 01
4
100. See, e.g., Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992) (custom must be followed
by a "considerable number of [respected] physicians" to afford defendant a complete defense).
101. Morreim, supra note 67, at 23.
102. See, e.g., Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. 1982); Toth v.
Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968), discussed in BARRY FURROW ET AL.,
LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 144 (4th ed. 2001).
103. Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 48, at 1394.
104. Morreim, supra note 67, at 18.
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A physician's decision as to the appropriate course of therapy in
a particular case may be influenced by several factors including: (1)
the characteristics of the patient (height, weight, age, and sex); (2) the
patient's medical history; (3) the patient's preferences; (4) the coverage
provided by the patient's health plan (including limitations imposed
by a health plan's drug formulary); (5) the physician's training and
area of specialization; (6) the array of diagnostic tools and therapeutic
responses available with respect to the medical condition in question;
and (7) the cost containment techniques employed by the patient's
managed care plan.' It is illusory to speak of a medical custom in
light of all these variable factors. In fact, the expert testimony on
medical custom in this regard may simply be the witness's personal
standard of care as influenced by who is paying him or her to testify.
First, there are the characteristics of the patient. There is tre-
mendous individual variation among patients. Patients presenting
with the same symptoms may require different diagnostic or therapeu-
tic responses due to other factors such as age, height, weight, and sex.
The likelihood of the patient suffering from a particular disease or
condition is often related to these other factors. Various treatment
modalities may be more or less appropriate based on the interplay
among these factors. The patient's medical history is also a relevant
factor. The selection of the appropriate diagnostic tool or treatment
may depend upon the physician's prior knowledge of the patient and
this in turn is linked to the duration of the physician's treatment rela-
tionship with the patient, the availability of medical records, and the
patient's ability to communicate with the physician.
In theory, under the doctrine of informed consent, patients are
supposed to have greater involvement in decisions concerning treat-
ment and diagnostic choices. Indeed, a physician who utterly fails to
involve the patient in decision-making may risk tort liability under the
doctrine of informed consent. The widespread judicial recognition of
informed consent coincides with an upsurge in consumer activism.
Certainly, younger physicians are more sensitized to the role of in-
formed consent than earlier generations and more inclined to involve
patients in treatment decisions.
On the other hand, as Peter Schuck has noted, there is often a
"gap" in this area between the law "in books and the law "in ac-
105. Cf., Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 48, at 1390-95 (discussing some of these fac-
tors). There also appears to be substantial regional variation in the patterns of surgical care
across the United States. See Practice Variations and the Quality of Surgical Care for Common
Conditions, in THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE: THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES, 140-74 (1999), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
99US/tocS.php.
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tion. ' ° For many routine procedures, the doctrine of informed con-
sent has had little impact. But in cases involving serious conditions
and more invasive procedures, the impact of the doctrine of informed
consent may have had a more significant impact. For example, when a
physician administers a treatment that could cause sterility to a
woman, the patient's interest in bearing a child is of utmost impor-
tance. Certainly, in many cases involving serious ailments, prefer-
ences of the patient or of the patient's family should play an important
role in the selection of a treatment or diagnostic procedure.
The treating physician's area of specialization may also have a
significant impact on the treatment selected. Surgeons are more likely
to choose surgical interventions while nonsurgical specialists may pre-
fer other forms of treatment. For example, cardiac patients who ex-
perience blockages of blood vessels leading to the heart may either un-
dergo bypass surgery if treated by a heart surgeon or angioplasty if
treated by cardiologist. And a patient with sinus problems may be
treated with antihistamines, decongestants, and antibiotics for sinusitis
by an allergist while an otolaryngologist may recommend surgical in-
tervention.
There are significant differences in insurance coverage that may
affect the physician's decision. Some patients may have no insurance
while others may have very generous coverage. A health plan may
cover surgery, but not prescriptions. Co-pays may vary according to
the type of treatment employed. Naturally, if the patient is going to
have to pay substantially more out of pocket for certain treatments,
this should have an impact on the choices made. An ideal physician-
agent would take the patient's cost preferences into account. For ex-
ample, an insurer may discharge an uninsured patient one day sooner
to save the patient the $1000 per day cost of an additional hospital
stay, while allowing an insured patient, or an uninsured patient with
higher income, an additional day. While an egalitarian approach to
health care access posits that there should not be differential treatment
based on insurance coverage, it is inevitable that insurance coverage
will influence treatment choices.
In the current health care environment, physicians must take into
account the cost containment features of the patient's health plans.
Physicians can no longer make autonomous choices as to diagnostic
tools and treatment modalities. The physician may have to gain prior
authorization for the use of some diagnostic tools and treatment mo-
dalities. Even if there is no prior authorization requirement, the prac-
tice patterns of the physician will inevitably be reviewed on a retro-
106. Peter Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903 (1994).
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spective basis. There are also financial incentives in place designed to
decrease physicians' use of expensive diagnostic tools and treatment
modalities. Physicians have to heed the policies of the patient's health
plan in making treatment choices or risk termination from the plan.
Due to ongoing technological developments there is also an array
of available diagnostic tools and treatment modalities with variations
in costs and potential benefits. As the complexity of medical care in-
creases and technological development accelerates, the tools available
for the diagnosis and treatment of particular diseases and conditions
continue to multiply. The marginal cost of the more expensive tools
may exceed their marginal benefits in particular cases. In these cases,
the physician, under the influence of financial incentives, may decide
to withhold the treatment as an inefficient use of resources and in
these instances custom has little to do with this determination.
IV. THE REASONABLE PRUDENT PHYSICIAN STANDARD:
OUTLINE OF A PROPOSED DOCTRINAL REGIME
Under the traditional malpractice standard, the physician has a
duty to treat the patient in accordance with the prevailing standards of
the profession. Changes in the health care environment require a re-
formulation of this standard. Under my proposal, a physician con-
tracting to treat subscribers to a health plan would have a duty to treat
patients with the care of a reasonable, prudent physician acting under
the same or similar circumstances, in good faith, and in the best inter-
ests of the patient. This language is borrowed in part from the stan-
dards of conduct for corporate officers set out in the Model Business
Corporation Act. °7 The analogy is appropriate because a physician in
the era of managed care acts as an "honest businessman" as well as a
"professional."
Moreover, as in the case of physicians: "[C]orporate managers
make numerous decisions that involve the balancing of risks and bene-
fits.... Although some decisions turn out to be unwise or the result
of a mistake in judgment, it is not reasonable to reexamine an unsuc-
cessful decision with the benefit of hindsight.""1 8 In the health care
context, the physician is making purchasing decisions on behalf of the
patient and the risk/benefit analysis is performed pursuant to the con-
tractual relationships among the physician, the health plan, and the
patient.
107. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42(a) (3d ed. Supp. 1998-1999); see also id. §
8.31(2) (concerning standards of liability for directors).
108. Id. at 8-192 (official comment to § 8.31).
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My proposed standard is also modeled on the standard set out in
the American Medical Association's (AMA) proposal for the adoption
of an administrative procedure for the resolution of malpractice
claims."°9 My proposal, however, goes somewhat beyond the AMA
proposal in more specifically recognizing the legitimate role of the
physician in effectuating cost containment goals. Under my proposed
doctrinal standard, the physician would be required to treat the patient
in accordance with the cost containment goals of the patient's health
plan.
My proposed standard will also impact certain features of the law
of informed consent. As to obligations of disclosure, where a more
costly alternative treatment or diagnostic technique has been withheld,
the physician would be obligated to provide this information to the
patient when it would be material to the patient. Similarly, the physi-
cian would be obligated to provide the patient with information of the
applicable financial incentives that may have influenced the physician
to provide the less costly alternative only when that information would
be material to the patient. Breach of these disclosure obligations,
however, should only be actionable in tort where provision of informa-
tion on the more costly alternative would have lead to an improved
outcome for the patient.
A. With the Care of a Reasonable, Prudent Physician
The reasonable, prudent physician standard is consistent with
the approach that courts take in most negligence cases other than pro-
fessional malpractice. The reasonable, prudent physician standard is
intended in part to embody the regime of the common law of negli-
gence. The applicable standard here is Learned Hand's risk for-
mula.110 It is also intended to adopt the T.J. Hooper rule insofar as it
recognizes that custom evidence is relevant but not binding."' This
was the approach taken by the Helling court in determining whether
the plaintiff should have been given a tonometry test." 2 It rejects the
traditional approach in malpractice cases insofar as the common law
treats a physician's failure to comply with prevailing unitary custom as
determinative on the liability issue.
The focus of inquiry under the reasonable, prudent physician
standard varies with the nature of the case. In some cases, the focus
109. See Carter G. Phillips & Paul E. Kalb, Replacing the Tort System for Medical Malprac-
tice, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 210 (1993); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative
Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (1989).
110. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
111. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
112. See Helling v. Carey, 183 Wash. 2d 514, 518-19, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974).
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should be on whether the treatment selected was carried out in accor-
dance with the level of skill generally prevailing in the profession. For
example, where it is alleged that a surgeon improperly performed a
surgical procedure or failed to properly diagnose a particular condi-
tion, the primary concern is with the level of the physician's skills.
There has been some confusion in the cases as to whether the
traditional standard of care refers to the minimal level of skill or aver-
age level of skill exercised by physicians." 3  Under the reasonable,
prudent physician standard, it is more appropriate to focus on the skill
level of the average practitioner. In the managed care context, man-
aged care plans, either explicitly or implicitly, vouch for the quality of
their physicians. Typically, there is a selection process for plan physi-
cians and usually some sort of continuing oversight of physicians by
the health plan. Moreover, in some health plans, the patient must se-
lect a gatekeeping physician from a list provided by the health plan.
Access to a specialist may require referral from the gatekeeper, and the
list of accessible specialists may be limited to those preselected by the
health plan.
Under these circumstances, it seems plausible that the patient's
expectation is that she will receive care in accordance with the average
level prevailing in the profession rather than at a minimal level. Inso-
far as the proposed standard focuses on the average level of skill rather
than the minimal level of skill, my proposed standard bears some re-
semblance to the implied warranty of merchantability in the law of
products liability as it applies to both manufacturers and retailers." 4
Under the implied warranty of merchantability, the seller is required
to provide goods of average quality. This analogy is appropriate be-
cause of the greater standardization of the practice of medicine within
health plans and the greater oversight of physician practices by health
plans.
Where a treatment or diagnostic procedure is withheld because
of cost, the focus should be on the risk/utility calculation. More par-
ticularly, the evidence in the case should focus on the appropriateness
of a physician's analysis of cost effectiveness and the influence of fi-
nancial incentives. These two are necessarily intertwined. When the
patient alleges an improper withholding of treatment, the inquiry fo-
cuses on the appropriateness of the physician's analysis of cost effec-
113. See, e.g., Holt v. Levine, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 20 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001).
114. Cf. William S. Brewbaker III, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations:
The Implied Warranty of Quality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1997) (proposing that
courts impose an implied warranty of quality on health plans).
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tiveness, and one factor in this inquiry is whether the physician was
unduly influenced by financial incentives.
While a physician could be held liable for negligently performing
this cost effectiveness analysis, we should recognize that in making a
decision as to the appropriate course of treatment or diagnostic proce-
dure for the patient in question, physicians are entitled to take costs
into account. Although these decisions may occasionally be errone-
ous, they should not be reexamined with the benefit of hindsight. The
focus of inquiry should be on the reasonableness of the decision at the
time that it was made with the information available to the physician.
This approach more accurately reflects the actual decision making
process of the physician in a managed care environment and the ex-
pectations of the contracting parties.
In cases where the patient alleges that the physician improperly
withheld treatment, the trier of fact should compare the cost effective-
ness of the treatment provided with the treatment withheld. Cer-
tainly, we should expect a reasonable, prudent physician to make
treatment decisions based on cost effectiveness and outcomes research
when such data is available."1 Professor Marc Rodwin has noted that
traditionally, the practice of medicine was primarily based on a physi-
cian's "medical training, individual experience, and local custom.'
116
More recently, however, there has been a shift toward "evidence-
based medicine" where "clinical choices" are supposed to be:
[B]ased on data from journal articles in medicine, epidemiology,
and economics[,] which rely on such analytical techniques as
random clinical control trials, multiple regression analysis, and
cost-effectiveness analysis. These methods don't require a
medical education and place nonphysicians trained in social sci-
ence, science, or public policy analysis on par with physicians." 7
Certainly, evidence-based medicine should be the key proof in an
action alleging that a physician negligently selected a particular treat-
ment or diagnostic tool. In a recent article, Professor Peter Jacobson
and Matthew Kanna persuasively argue that cost effectiveness analysis
115. See generally Jacobson & Kanna, supra note 16, at 293-301. Cost effectiveness analy-
ses may or may not be used in outcomes research. Thus, cost effectiveness is a particular meth-
odology that is frequently used in outcomes studies, but outcomes research may rely on other
methodologies. Conversation with Stephen Mennemeyer, Ph.D., University of Alabama School
of Public Health (August 28, 2001).
116. Marc A. Rodwin, The Politics of Evidence-Based Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 439, 440 (2001).
117. Id. at 440-41.
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should be incorporated into the standard of care. 8 They further sug-
gest that it should be "treated as one piece of evidence to be consid-
ered by the jury rather than being used to determine the standard of
care.""' 9 In discussing the value of "evidence-based medicine," Pro-
fessor Rodwin opines that the available evidence may frequently not
be determinative on the question of the appropriate choice of treat-
ment in a particular case. 2 '
In another recent article, Professor Arnold Rosoff notes:
"[O]utcomes research is increasingly making it possible to know and
know more precisely and certainly what is, and what is not, effective
therapy."'' And Dr. F. Ronald Feinstein, a practicing physician, has
noted: "Bringing and evidence-based outcomes-study approach to
clinical decision-making will go a long way toward reducing unwanted
variation and lead to savings in both individual and natural re-
sources."1
22
At the time of the actual delivery of care, the costs to the patient
may be minimal, amounting to the payment of a copayment or de-
ductible. Accordingly, with respect to cost effectiveness, the costs
should be calculated from the health plan's perspective. Moreover, in
light of the ongoing contractual relationship, the plan (and the physi-
118. Jacobson & Kanna, supra note 16, at 292. The authors describe cost effectiveness
analysis as follows: "In assessing the alternatives, CEA (cost effectiveness analysis) uses a ratio
where the denominator is the gain in health (such as adverse reactions avoided) and the numera-
tor is the incremental cost of obtaining the benefits. The denominator may be expressed in years
of lives saved or undesirable outcomes averted." Id. at 293. They further note that cost effec-
tiveness analysis is sometimes distinguished from cost benefit analysis because in the former the
effectiveness of resource use is expressed in nonmonetary terms, while in the latter it is expressed
in terms of dollars. Id. They also refer to cost utility analysis where the benefit is expressed in
terms of quality adjusted life years. Id. Finally, they note that "some economists treat CBA
[cost benefit analysis] and CUA [cost utility analysis] as a variant of CEA." Id. at 293 n.3. In
this article, I use the term in the latter sense to encompass cost benefit analysis, cost utility analy-
sis and cost effectiveness analysis.
119. Id. at 293.
120. Rodwin, supra note 116, at 442. He further notes:
Sometimes[,] evidence may be preliminary rather than well established, or the thera-
pies may be so new that their long-term effects are not known. Assessments of the ef-
fectiveness of a therapy may vary across studies depending on the population studied,
the questions asked, or the methodology employed. Even when an area is carefully
scrutinized, there is frequently significant uncertainty and ambiguity about what ap-
proach will work best. The pros and cons of different therapies may also vary
depending on the patient's other medical conditions. There may be trade-offs
between effectiveness and safety, or between effectiveness in treating the medical con-
dition and quality of life.
Id. at 442-43.
121. Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& L. 327, 328 (2001).
122. F. Ronald Feinstein, Access to Health Care: It's Not Rocket Science-It's Tougher, 22 J.
LEG. MED. 235, 237 (2001).
Seattle University Law Review
cian) should be expected to take a longer view. Thus, in a particular
case, it may be that use of a relatively more expensive approach today
could head off problems downstream and actually save money in the
long run. Generally, the cost effectiveness of the treatment is calcu-
lated by determining the costs of the treatment to the health plan and
comparing those costs to the potential outcome for the patient in terms
of "gain in health" both immediately and in the longer term
12 1
Clinical practice guidelines may also have some bearing on the
appropriateness of the physician's decision to withhold treatment. In
effect, the physician may allege that the group that has formulated the
clinical practice guideline has already done an appropriate cost benefit
analysis. There has been some controversy under the professional
standard as to the role of clinical practice guidelines in malpractice
cases. In some cases, a plaintiff may rely on a clinical practice guide-
line to establish liability on the part of a physician. In other cases, the
physician may attempt to justify the withholding of a particular treat-
ment or diagnostic procedure by pointing to a practice guideline or
clinical protocol. Most of the controversy has focused on whether
clinical practice guidelines may be used to establish the customary
standard either standing alone or in support of expert testimony.
In a recent article, Professor Michelle Mello has argued against
increased reliance on clinical practice guidelines to establish the stan-
dard of care in malpractice cases."' She reasons that under the cus-
tomary standard, it is not appropriate to place too much emphasis on
clinical practice guidelines because "[clinical practice guidelines] do
not appear to represent custom in most instances."'23 Mello further ar-
gues that, while it may be appropriate for courts to admit clinical prac-
tice guidelines into evidence for the consideration of the jury in order
to establish custom, the guidelines should not displace expert testi-
mony on the prevailing standard of care.'26 On the other hand, Pro-
fessor Mark Hall has argued that, while compliance with a guideline
could provide a conclusive defense to a malpractice action, violation of
a guideline should not be treated as conclusive evidence of malprac-
123. Jacobson & Kanna, supra note 16, at 293. The authors further state: "In assessing
alternative, CEA uses a ratio where the denominator is the gain in health (such as adverse reac-
tions avoided) and the numerator is the incremental cost of obtaining the benefits. The denomi-
nator may be expressed in years of lives saved or undesirable outcomes averted." Id.
124. Mello, supra note 49.
125. Id. at 709.
126. Id. at 710 (arguing that clinical practice guidelines should not replace expert testimony
as to the customary standard of care, but should be used to support expert opinion as to the pre-
vailing custom). Contra Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of
Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1989)
(arguing that juries should not be permitted to disregard or overrule clinical practice guidelines).
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tice. 127 He argues that differential treatment is appropriate in light of
the two schools of thought (or respectable minority) doctrine.1
21
The use of clinical practice guidelines is not particularly prob-
lematic under the reasonable, prudent physician standard. The physi-
cian's compliance or noncompliance with a clinical practice guideline
should be treated as relevant, but not conclusive evidence on the ques-
tion of whether the defendant acted as a reasonable, prudent physi-
cian. This approach is actually consistent with the current approach
taken by most courts under the customary standard. As noted by Pro-
fessor Mello, "the prevailing practice is to admit [clinical practice
guidelines] in connection with expert testimony, but not to give them
determinative weight.' 29 Certainly, if clinical practice guidelines are
relevant to the jury's assessment of whether the defendant acted in ac-
cordance with the prevailing professional standard, they will also be
relevant to the question of whether the physician acted in a reasonable
and prudent manner under the circumstances.
Where the physician has complied with a guideline or protocol in
denying access to a particular treatment or diagnostic technique, the
physician is in effect arguing that the group that developed the guide-
line performed the relevant cost effectiveness analysis in an appropri-
ate manner. Compliance with a guideline certainly supports an infer-
ence that the physician performed the cost effectiveness analysis in a
reasonable and prudent manner in the case at bar, but should not be
conclusive on the question. And likewise the plaintiff should be able
to use the physician's noncompliance with a guideline to establish that
the physician's cost effectiveness analysis was unreasonable.
The strength of inference in cases of both compliance and non-
compliance with a clinical practice guideline depends on a number of
other factors including the nature of the issuing organization and the
fit between the guideline and the particular case. If the guideline is is-
sued by a reputable medical specialty organization, this is certainly
persuasive evidence that the complying physician acted as a reasonable
prudent physician. In this regard, Professor Mello notes that these
guidelines are particularly authoritative because "unlike insurers, phy-
sicians' financial incentives have traditionally been aligned with pro-
viding top quality care to their patients.""' ° On the other hand, if the
guideline is issued by a health plan, it may be entitled to less deference
because such guidelines "are heavily influenced by cost-control con-
127. Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litiga-
tion, 54 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 131 (1991).
128. Id.
129. Mello, supra note 49, at 665 (citing Hall, supra note 129, at 131 & n.53).
130. Mello, supra note 49, at 650.
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cerns."'' Such considerations should also come into play under the
reasonable prudent physician standard.
Under the customary standard, there is apparently still some un-
certainty as to whether evidence of financial incentives is admissible to
prove breach of the standard of care. 3 2 The central question in these
cases is whether evidence of financial incentives is relevant to the issue
of breach of the standard of care.'33 In a 1999 article, Paul Sugarman
and Valerie Yarashus, partners in a Boston law firm, argue that such
evidence should be "admissible ... because it provides an explanation
for the defendant's treatment decisions and sheds critical light on
whether the patient received the benefit of the defendant's best medi-
cal judgment unencumbered by competing financial considera-
tions ....
On the other hand, in Shea v. Esensten (Shea III), the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that the trial court judge properly excluded evi-
dence that managed care financial incentives discouraged referrals to
specialists. 3 ' In Shea, The plaintiff's husband died of a heart attack
after being treated by defendants, Drs. Esensten and Arenson, for
chest and abdominal pain.'36 The doctors had referred the decedent to
a gastroenterologist, but not a cardiologist.'37 There was a dispute in
the evidence as to whether the decedent had ever asked to be referred
to a cardiologist. 3 '
The plaintiff sought to offer evidence regarding the structure of
financial incentives under her husband's health plan in order to show
why he had not been referred to a cardiologist.'39 The appellate court
concluded that the exclusion of this evidence was in the discretion of
the trial court judge where there was no showing of relevance to the
plaintiff's claim for malpractice. 41 On the question of relevance, the
appellate court stated: "The elements of malpractice do not require the
plaintiff to show a physician's reasons or motivations for departing
from acceptable standards. Instead, it is the proof that the physician
in fact departed from the standard of care that is critical."'' The court
131. Id.
132. Sugarman & Yarashus, supra note 83, at 748.
133. Id. at 754.
134. Id. at 760.
135. 622 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Shea III].
136. Id.
137. Id. at 133.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 146.
141. Id. at 135.
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also observed that under the Minnesota licensing statute, 142 a physi-
cian has no duty to disclose the existence of a capitation contract to a
patient.
Although the admissibility of evidence of financial incentives
may be problematic under the traditional customary standard, it seems
obvious that evidence as to financial incentives and their effect on
physician decision making is relevant to the inquiry as to whether the
defendant acted as a reasonable, prudent physician in failing to pro-
vide a more expensive diagnostic technique or treatment. While the
custom standard is narrowly focused on prevailing practices, the rea-
sonable, prudent physician standard is more contextual. Proof of the
existence of a financial motive may not in itself establish liability, but
it certainly has some bearing on the question of !iability. Accordingly,
evidence of financial incentives should ordinarily be admissible to es-
tablish that the defendant negligently failed to select a more costly al-
ternative treatment or diagnostic technique.
B. Acting Under the Same or Similar Circumstances
The AMA proposal advocates a change in substantive law by
suggesting that the customary standard should be replaced by the
standard of a reasonable, prudent, and competent physician working
under similar circumstances.' The factors to be considered under the
AMA proposal include the level of the physician's expertise, the state
of medical knowledge, the availability of health care facilities, and
"whether the nature or severities of the patient's medical problems
limit the options available for treatment.' 14 4 This listing of factors,
however, is not sufficiently comprehensive.
142. Id. The statute provides the following:
(1) The following conduct is prohibited and is grounds for disciplinary action:
(p) Fee splitting, including without limitation:
(4) dispensing for profit any drug or device, unless the physician has disclosed the
physician's own profit interest. The physician must make the disclosures required in
this clause in advance and in writing to the patient and must include in the disclosure
a statement that the patient is free to choose a different health care provider. This
clause does not apply to the distribution of revenues from a partnership, group prac-
tice, nonprofit corporation, or professional corporation to its partners, shareholders,
members, or employees if the revenues consist only of fees for services performed by
the physician or under a physician's direct supervision, or to the division or distribu-
tion of prepaid or capitated health care premiums, or fee-for-service withhold
amounts paid under contracts established under other state law.
MINN. STAT. § 147.091(l)(p)(4) (2001).
143. Phillips & Kalb, supra note 109, at 212-13.
144. Id. at 213.
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The acting under the same or similar circumstances language of
my proposed standard is intended to recognize that the conduct of the
physician of the physician is to be judged in light of the specific fac-
tual context including such factors as: (1) the characteristics of the in-
dividual patient; (2) the complexity of the case; (3) the urgency of the
situation; (4) the information about the patient's condition that was
available to the physician at the time of the treatment; (5) the back-
ground and training of the physician (i.e., more is to be expected of a
board-certified specialist); (6) the resources available in the local
treatment community; and (7) the terms of the patient's health plan.
Of particular importance among these contextual factors are the
terms of the patient's health plan. Physicians in their rationing role
also constantly make decisions requiring the balancing of costs and
benefits. Under my proposed standard, the physician duty in tort is
modified by the physician's obligation to provide treatment that is in
accordance with the cost containment goals of the patient's health
plan. The physician's balancing of costs and benefits in making
treatment decisions is also consistent with an economic model of man-
aged care that views the patient as delegating to the physician the task
of taking clinical and cost considerations into account as the patient
would if she had sufficient information. Accordingly, in holding phy-
sicians accountable in tort, the triers of fact should consider the effect
on physicians of legitimate cost containment mechanisms of the pa-
tient's health plan. Juries should be appropriately instructed in this
regard.
Reference to the plan's cost containment provisions in this con-
text is also appropriate here because of the initial contract to provide
health care coverage. When purchasing coverage from a health plan,
the patient becomes part of a risk pool consisting of all health plan
members. The contract contemplates that the plan will utilize a vari-
ety of cost containment techniques to provide cost-effective treatment
to the patient. This benefits the patient over the long run because it
will contain the costs of coverage. It also has the additional benefit of
protecting the patient from unnecessary treatment that was more likely
to occur under the older cost-based reimbursement model of health
care financing. When the physician contracts to treat patients insured
by a particular health plan, the physician should look to the interests
of all the patients covered by that plan."4 s
145. In this regard, Professors Hall and Berenson state:
We propose that the devotion to each individual patient's best medical interests be re-
placed with an ethic that calls for devotion to the best medical interests of the group
for which the physician is responsible. Physicians working in organizations with re-
strained resources should attempt to maximize overall health outcomes for all patients
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C. In Good Faith and the Best Interests of the Patient
The good faith and best interests requirements are intended to
require the physician to act in accordance with the fiduciary nature of
the physician/patient relationship. But the physician's fiduciary role
vis-A-vis the patient is necessarily limited by the physician's obliga-
tions to the patient's health plan.'46 Certainly, the obligation of good
faith is violated by a physician who acts or fails to act solely because of
his or her own financial interests. And the best interests requirement
complements the good faith requirement insofar as it requires the phy-
sician to put the interests of the patient ahead of his or her own finan-
cial interests.
These obligations, however, should be viewed in light of the
physician's obligation to provide cost-effective care in accordance with
the cost containment policies of the patient's health plan. The good
faith and best interests do not require the physician to provide care to
the patient regardless of its cost. After all, the purpose of the financial
incentive arrangements employed by a health plan is to force physi-
cians to take costs into account.
Under the general principles of agency law, "an agent is subject
to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in
all matters connected with his agency." '147 On the other hand, "one
employed as an agent violates no duty to the principal by acting for his
own benefit if he makes a full disclosure of the facts to an acquiescent
principal and takes no unfair advantage of him."' 48  The physician
who responds in an appropriate manner to financial incentives does
not have a conflict of interest in the same sense as a purchasing agent
who receives an undisclosed kickback from the seller of goods pur-
chased on behalf of the principal.
In the managed care context, the cost containment features are
deliberately designed to force the physician to take costs into account
treated in that setting rather than to maximize care for their personal patients....
The shift from individual health to group health is consistent with managed care's fo-
cus on the health of the population it serves and with the basis on which HMOs and
providers increasingly are being judged for quality of care. The group focus is also
consistent with the very essence of insurance, which is based on subscribers' pooling
their medical and economic interests with others.
Mark A. Hall & Robert A. Berenson, The Ethics of Managed Care: A Dose of Realism, 28 CUMB.
L. REV. 287, 306-07 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
146. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 255 (1995) (noting that
"the law may hold doctors to fiduciary standards yet also expect physicians to take adequate ac-
count of the interests of many patients or even parties other than patients").
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
148. Id. at § 390 cmt. a.
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and appropriately designed financial incentives may be an effective
means of achieving that desired response. Presumably, the patient (or
the patient's employer) has purchased the coverage under the plan at
least in part because of its desirable cost containment features. As
long as the plan's financial incentives for its physician are disclosed to
the patient by the plan at the outset, there should be no breach of the
duty of loyalty merely by taking into account the cost effectiveness of
available treatments.
Some aspects of my proposed good faith and best interests com-
ponent are borrowed from the business judgment rule in corporate
law. In a 1994 article, Professors Arkes and Schipani discussed the
analogy between the situation of corporate directors and physicians in
a decision-making role.149 But they stop short of proposing that the
medical liability doctrinal regime be reconfigured along the lines of the
business judgment rule.' Their analogy, however, has become even
more appropriate in light of the dual role of physicians the current en-
vironment as both "professional" and "honest businessman."
In corporate law, there is a presumption that directors and offi-
cers have acted in good faith and the best interests of the corporation
in making a business decision.'' Consistent with the business judg-
ment rule, physicians are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that
they have acted in good faith and in the best interests of their patient.
This presumption could, however, be overcome by evidence that the
financial incentives are simply too strong an influence on physician
behavior.
Naturally, to establish a breach of duty the patient should also
have to establish that the physician failed to provide care that a rea-
sonable, prudent physician acting under similar circumstances would
provide due to the overweening influence of the financial incentives.
As Professors Hall and Berenson note: "If doctors start seeing dollar
signs on their patient's heads, the incentives are too strong."152 Under
my proposal, in order to recover damages, the patient would have to
establish some actual harm as a result of the influence of the financial
incentives. Ordinarily, this harm would consist of the loss of a chance
149. Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule:
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994).
150. Id. at 629.
151. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANNOT., supra note 107, at 8-197 (official comment to
§ 8.31).
152. Hall & Berenson, supra note 145, at 305.
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of an improved condition because of the denial of access to a particular
treatment or diagnostic procedure.'53
The fiduciary nature of the physician/patient relationship is nec-
essarily limited by the contractual undertakings among the physician,
the patient and the health plan. The fiduciary obligation does not im-
pose an absolute duty that requires the physician to ignore financial
incentives. The appropriate balance between the physician's fiduciary
obligation to the patient and the physician's obligation to conserve re-
sources by appropriately responding to financial incentives will neces-
sarily be worked out on a case-by-case basis. In this regard, Professors
Hall and Berenson propose a series of ethical guidelines that could be
useful to courts in determining whether the physician has acted in
good faith and in the patient's best interests:
Financial incentives should influence physicians in their profes-
sional, not their personal or business, lives. That is, financial in-
centives should cause doctors to think about what is necessary
for their patient's health care and what is advisable for their own
professional reputations, not what will increase their own in-
come....
Physicians should not enter into incentive arrangements they
would be embarrassed to describe accurately to their pa-
tients ....
Physicians should be wary of incentive arrangements that are
not in common use elsewhere in the market ...' 54
Lack of candor concerning the influence of financial incentives is
also indicative of bad faith and failure to act in the patient's best inter-
ests. An important component of the good faith and best interests re-
quirement is the obligation of the physician to make appropriate dis-
closures to the patient. As Professors Hall and Berenson note:
"Fidelity to patients also requires a strong measure of candor, espe-
cially when physicians function under a financial conflict of interest
and these conflicts are not obvious or in common knowledge, as in the
case today with capitation and physician ownership interests."' 55
The most important issues regarding the scope of disclosure ob-
ligations of physicians are: (1) whether the treating physician should
be required to inform the patient of alternative treatments or diagnos-
tic procedures that are being withheld for financial reasons; and (2)
153. Cf. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 619, 664
P.2d 474, 479 (1983) (recognizing the loss of chance doctrine).
154. Hall & Berenson, supra note 145, at 304-05.
155. Id. at 312.
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whether the treating physician should disclose the plan's financial in-
centives to the patient where those incentives are designed to influence
the physician's treatment decisions. Some commentators argue for an
expansive version of the informed consent doctrine that would impose
disclosure obligations on the treating physician both as to financial in-
centives and withheld treatments, i s6 while others argue that blanket
imposition of these more expansive duties is inappropriate." 7 These
debates parallel earlier conflicts between informed consent idealists
and realists.'
Under my proposal, physicians would be held responsible for
failure to disclose more costly alternative treatments or diagnostic
treatments where this information would be material to a reasonable
patient. Some courts already recognize the obligation of a physician to
inform the patient of alternative treatments' 59 Under my proposal, a
physician should be required to disclose a more costly treatment or di-
agnostic alternatives where this information would be material to a pa-
tient; that is, where the selection of the less costly alternative could
have a significant impact on the patient's health or where the physi-
cian knows or reasonably should know that the rationing decision will
be especially important to the particular patient.
The latter requirement contemplates a more subjective standard.
In other, more routine circumstances, a physician should not be obli-
gated to disclose the existence of withheld diagnostic techniques or
treatment alternatives. As noted by Professor Hall, if the requirement
of disclosure is imposed across the board, it could greatly increase the
amount of time that physicians spend with their patients and ulti-
mately increase the costs of health care and undermine the physi-
cian/patient relationship. 16  The difficulty is in drawing the line be-
tween those cases where the information concerning alternative
treatments is material to the patient and those where it is not. Unfor-
tunately, this will have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis.
There has also been an ongoing debate among commentators as
to whether disclosure by the physician of financial incentives should
be required under the doctrine of informed consent. Professor Hall
has evinced some skepticism as to the propriety of imposing this obli-
gation on physicians and is concerned about the effect of such disclo-
156. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 66.
157. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511
(1997).
158. Schuck, supra note 106, at 902.
159. See, e.g., Archer v. Galbraith, 18 Wash. App. 369, 567 P.2d 1155 (1978).
160. Hall, supra note 157, at 545-46.
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sures on the trust aspect of the physician/patient relationship.' On
the other hand, Professor Johnston favors the imposition on the treat-
ing physician of this disclosure obligation.
16 2
At this point, there is limited support in case law for imposing an
obligation on physicians to disclose financial incentives. In Moore v.
Regents of the University of California,'63 the California Supreme Court
expanded the informed consent disclosure obligation to impose a duty
on the physician to disclose financial conflicts of interests arising from
the use of the patient's cells by researchers to develop a highly profit-
able cell line.'64 But Moore may have limited precedential value be-
cause of its unusual facts. In Moore, the plaintiff alleged that he had
specifically and repeatedly inquired as to the commercial value of his
blood and bodily substances and that defendant Golde actively con-
cealed the commercial possibilities. 6 ' In Moore, the financial incen-
tives in question did not arise from the contract between the plan and
the physician, and they were not developed for the potentially benefi-
cial purpose of encouraging physicians to withhold marginally benefi-
cial treatment. Thus, it does not appear that Moore supports the no-
tion that a physician has a general obligation to disclose financial
incentives to the patient.
In Neade v. Portes,66 the Illinois Supreme Court refused to rec-
ognize a distinct cause of action against a physician for the failure to
disclose financial incentives.'67 But in Shea I, the Eighth Circuit im-
posed a duty on a health plan under ERISA to disclose financial incen-
tives. '68 Subsequently, in Shea II, the Eighth Circuit held that ERISA
did not preempt a state law claim against physicians for negligent mis-
representation.'69 After reviewing Minnesota case law, the court con-
cluded: "Minnesota law indicates that the breach of a doctor's state-
imposed ethical duty to disclose financial incentives is a medical mal-
practice claim, requiring a showing of actual harm to state a cause of
action. '  Accordingly, it remanded the case to the district court with
161. Id. at 526.
162. Kim Johnston, Patient Advocates or Patient Adversaries? Using Fiduciary Law To Com-
pel Disclosure of Managed Care Financial Incentives, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 957 (1998).
163. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
164. Id. at 485.
165. Id. at 485-86.
166. 739 N.E.2d 496 (Il1. 2000)
167. Id. at 498.
168. Shea v. Esenten, 107 F.3d 625, 626 (8th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Shea I.
169. Shea v. Esenten, 208 F.3d 712, 719 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Shea II].
170. Id. at 717 (relying on D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997)).
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directions to remand the misrepresentation claim to the state court. 171
Subsequently, in the trial in state court, the jury returned a verdict for
the physicians and this verdict was affirmed on appeal.1
2
In Pegram v. Herdrich,173 the United States Supreme Court re-
jected a full frontal assault mounted under ERISA attacking the use of
financial incentives to influence physician behavior. The court held
"that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions by health plan physi-
cians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA. '1 4 It is not clear what
effect the Pegram decision will have on the attempt to impose obliga-
tions to disclose financial incentives. In imposing the disclosure obli-
gation under ERISA, Shea i17' relied in part on the questionable na-
ture of the financial incentives. These types of arrangements have
now, however, arguably been upheld as consistent with public policy.
On the other hand, in footnote eight of its opinion in Pegram, the
court somewhat obliquely states:
Although we are not presented with the issue here, it could be
argued that Carle [the health plan working through its physi-
cian-owners] is a fiduciary insofar as it has discretionary author-
ity to administer the health plan, and so it is obligated to disclose
characteristics of the health plan and of those who provide ser-
vices to the health plan, if that information affects beneficiaries
material interests. 176
In conclusion, under my proposed standard, the physician is not
required to provide information to the patient on the health plan's fi-
nancial incentive structure at the time of enrollment. The physician
satisfies her obligation to the patient by disclosing alternative diagnos-
tic techniques or treatments in cases at the time of treatment where
this information would be material to the patient. Along with the dis-
closure of these alternatives, however, the physician should also be re-
quired to share with the patient the cost considerations that influenced
the physician's decision.
If the financial incentive arrangements influenced the physician's
decision, then that information ought to be provided to the patient. It
is not necessary to go into a detailed disclosure of financial incentive
arrangement at the time of delivery of care, but the physician should at
least alert the patient to the fact that financial incentives did play a role
171. Id. at 721.
172. Shea 111, 622 N.W.2d at 132.
173. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
174. Id. at 237.
175. Shea 1, 107 F.3d at 628.
176. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228 n.8.
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in the selection of treatment. As Mark Hall has noted, it seems un-
duly burdensome on the physician to keep track of the financial incen-
tive arrangement of each patient's plan and frequently unnecessary to
discuss such matters with each patient on an individual basis. 77
Moreover, imposing such an obligation may have the potential to
significantly undermine the physician/patient relationship if it is done
on a constant and repetitive basis.'78 On the other hand, where the se-
lection of a particular treatment or diagnostic tool may have serious
consequences to the patient, and where financial incentives played a
role in the physician's selection of a less expensive alternative, it is ap-
propriate that the physician share that information with the patient.
Indeed, some patients may find this candor refreshing, and gain in-
creased respect for the physician.
Nonetheless, a patient should not be permitted to recover dam-
ages for the physician's breach of the disclosure obligation unless the
patient establishes a causal link between the physician's failure to dis-
close and some actual harm. In a typical informed consent case, the
patient is required to establish two types of causation. First, the pa-
tient must establish that the patient actually suffered some adverse
event as the result of the administration of the treatment. Secondly, in
the usual case, the patient must establish that an appropriate disclo-
sure would have resulted in the patient refusing the proffered treat-
ment that resulted in the adverse event. The vast majority of jurisdic-
tions have adopted an objective test of causation that focuses on
whether or not a reasonable prudent patient would have pursued a dif-
ferent course if properly informed and thereby avoided injury.1
79
Establishing this counterfactual scenario becomes more difficult
where the patient is basing her claim on: (1) the failure of the physi-
cian to inform the patient of a more costly alternative treatment; or (2)
the failure of the physician to disclose the financial incentives that in-
fluenced the physician's selection of a less costly diagnostic or treat-
ment alternative. In these cases, the plaintiff must show that the
proper disclosure would have resulted in avoiding the injury. The in-
jury could be (1) a failure to diagnose a condition that would have
been diagnosed with use of an alternative diagnostic tool; (2) an ad-
verse side effect of the treatment or diagnostic technique selected that
would not have occurred if an alternative had been utilized; or (3) fail-
177. Hall, supra note 157, at 548-49.
178. Id.
179. Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1154 (Ala. 1985); Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 137
Wash. 2d 651, 665 n.4, 975 P.2d 950, 957 n.4 (1999).
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ure to achieve a cure or an improved condition that would have been
achieved if an alternative treatment had been selected.
Where the patient alleges that the physician failed to inform the
patient of a more costly alternative treatment, then the patient must
show that the disclosure would have resulted in the patient success-
fully seeking the more expensive alternative and that the alternative
could have avoided the injury incurred by the patient. This would re-
quire the patient to establish that she either would have paid out of
pocket for the more expensive alternative or successfully sought some
recourse under the terms of the plan.
As to the failure to disclose financial alternatives, the patient
must establish that the disclosure of this information would have in-
creased her suspicion of the physician's motive, and thereby led her to
seek care at her own expense outside the parameters of the plan. Al-
ternatively, she would have to show that she would have successfully
pursued some other recourse under the plan. In these cases, it may be
very difficult to persuade a jury that disclosure by the physician would
have led the patient to pursue successfully these alternative paths.
Notwithstanding the current majority rule, the patient should be
held to a subjective standard in these cases rather than an objective
standard of causation.' ° Under both standards, the primary evidence
is the patient's statement as to what he or she would have done if
properly informed. The primary difference between the two standards
is the jury instructions given under each. Under the objective stan-
dard, the jury is instructed to judge the plaintiff's claims against a rea-
sonable person standard. Instead, the jury should be allowed to focus
on what the particular patient would have done rather than the hypo-
thetical reasonable patient. This is more in keeping with the stated
goal of the doctrine of informed consent: the enhancement of patient
autonomy.
Another component of the best interests requirement is the obli-
gation to act as the patient's agent in dealing with the patient's health
plan. Under some state court decisions,'' it has been recognized that
a physician may be required to act as an advocate for his or her patient
in obtaining authorization for treatment. In addition, it has been rec-
ognized that a physician may have an obligation to process in a timely
manner the necessary paperwork required for referral of a patient to a
specialist."' Under the best interests component of the reasonable
180. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Ok. 1980).
181. See, e.g., Wickline v. State of Cal., 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). But cf.
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that under
New Jersey law physician to act as advocate for a patient to an HMO).
182. See, e.g., Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 711 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1999).
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prudent physician standard, the physician should have a duty to act as
the patient's agent in providing appropriate advocacy for the patient.
The physician should also be obligated to act as the patient's agent in
order to provide the necessary information and paper work to the
health plan's administrators in a timely fashion.
CONCLUSION
Under my proposed standard, a physician has a duty to treat pa-
tients with the care of a reasonable, prudent physician acting under
similar circumstances in good faith and the best interests of the pa-
tient. This tort duty is, however, modified by the obligation of the
physician to treat the patient in accordance with the legitimate cost
containment provisions of the patient's health plan. Adoption of this
standard would require courts to take into account the contractual ar-
rangements among the patient, the physician and the health plan.
My proposal also borrows from the laws governing the conduct
of corporate officers and agents. It includes a rebuttable presumption
that the physician has acted in good faith and best interests in select-
ing treatments or diagnostic procedures. This presumption may be
rebutted by evidence showing that the financial incentive arrange-
ments agreed to by the physician place too much pressure on the phy-
sician to place his or her financial interests ahead of the patient. Natu-
rally, in order to recover in tort the breach of this fiduciary obligation,
the patient must still show actual harm. This actual harm would con-
sist of a worsened condition because of the denial of access to more
beneficial treatment because of the improper influence of financial in-
centives. The good faith and best interests component of my pro-
posed standard also impose significant requirements on the physician
to be candid with the patient concerning the influence of financial in-
centives.
My proposal builds in part on the foundation laid by the Su-
preme Court of Washington in Helling. In that case, the court disre-
garded testimony as to the prevailing custom and held two physicians
liable for their failure to provide a patient with a diagnostic test. Al-
though the Helling court's cost/benefit analysis may be flawed and has
been widely criticized, its focus on the cost-effectiveness of withheld
treatment provides a better approach than the traditional rule in the
era of managed care.
Health plans have been dropping pre-authorization requirements
in response to liability concerns and placing responsibility on physi-
cians to take into account the cost of the care that they provide. The
traditional physician/patient relationship has been altered by the pres-
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ence of a third party, the health plan, and its concern that physicians
provide care in an economically efficient manner. The role of the
health plan in providing financial incentives for the provision of cost
effective care is perfectly legitimate in light of the contractual ar-
rangements between the patient and the plan. In the current health
care environment, physicians act in dual roles as both a "professional"
and "honest businessman." '183 In the latter role, the physician is in ef-
fect acting as a rationing agent. Physicians are now expected to take
costs into account when selecting treatments and diagnostic tests for
their patients. Therefore, it is appropriate to modify the liability re-
gime to take into account the physician's role in cost containment.
Under the liability regime that I propose, custom evidence would
no longer be determinative in malpractice cases. The notion of a uni-
tary custom that can serve as the benchmark for delivery of profes-
sional services is no longer tenable. Moreover, in determining whether
a physician acted reasonably in denying access to a particular treat-
ment or diagnostic technique, the courts should look to such evidence
as cost-effectiveness and outcome studies and clinical practice guide-
lines in determining whether the physician breached his or her legal
duty to the patient, but none of these standing alone should be conclu-
sive on the issue of liability.
While the notion of custom as a unitary standard is untenable in
the managed care environment, evidence as to prevailing practices
may still be helpful in resolving some malpractice cases. Certainly,
physicians whose skills do not come up to the level of the average
practitioner should be subject to liability. Where the patient is injured
because of the physician's lack of skill, inadvertence or use of an im-
proper technique, testimony should focus primarily on the techniques
taught in medical schools and utilized in the profession. Because of
the necessity of customizing techniques for individual patients, it may
still be impossible to identify a unitary custom. Accordingly, even in
these cases, prevailing practice evidence should be treated as relevant
but not binding.
Although the courts have been slouching toward a reasonable,
prudent physician standard, they have not sketched out the parame-
ters of a new doctrinal regime to supplant the traditional customary
standard approach. Of course, common law courts do not normally
promulgate comprehensive regimes, preferring rather to develop doc-
trine on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. My proposal provides an out-
line of a new doctrinal regime. While it is admittedly incomplete and
tentative, it may at least provide an impetus for courts to question the
183. Brody, supra note 43.
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role of customary standards in malpractice litigation. Particularly in
cases involving the withholding or denial of treatment, it is my hope
that the courts will recognize that physicians should be held account-
able for negligently rationing health care. On the other hand, this ac-
countability must be tempered by the recognition that the physician's
rationing role is necessary for the common good.
